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Abstract
What is intuitive: pro-social or anti-social behaviour? To answer this fundamental ques-
tion, recent studies analyse decision times in game theory experiments under the assump-
tion that intuitive decisions are fast and that deliberation is slow. Lacking any knowledge
of the underlying dynamics, such simplistic approach might however lead to erroneous
interpretations.
Here we model the cognitive basis of strategic cooperative decision making using the
Drift Diffusion Model to discern between deliberation and intuition and describe the evo-
lution of the decision making in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments.
We find that rational deliberation quickly becomes dominant over an initial intuitive
bias towards cooperation, which is fostered by positive interactions as much as frustrated
by a negative one. However, this initial pro-social tendency is resilient, as after a pause it
resets to the same initial value. These results illustrate the new insight that can be achieved
thanks to a quantitative modelling of human behavior.
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Introduction
Decision times have emerged as a new important aspect in experimental game theory. They
have been measured in a wide range of games like: Ultimatum games [1, 2], Modified Dic-
tator games [3] and Public Goods games [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Some studies, based on the premise
that decisions which take less time are more intuitive, suggest that making unselfish, coopera-
tive decisions is a human instinct that is then undermined by rational deliberation [4, 8]. The
claim that showed that people under pressure make more cooperative decisions [4] failed a re-
cent Registered Replication Report [9] including 21 independent experiments. Other criticisms
include that, after controlling for the strength-of-preference between the two options, there is
no significant difference between the pro-social and the selfish behavior [10]. A more detailed
meta-analysis of a large number of experiments suggests that things are more complicated,
claiming that deliberation inhibits what they called ‘pure cooperation’, however it does not ap-
pear to inhibit the strategic cooperation [11]. Studies using fMRI scanners to monitor brain
activity of human subjects participating in Game Theory experiments show that selfish partici-
pants will cooperate when they have incentive to cooperate: consequently cooperation can also
be a result of longer deliberation, not just intuitive acts of pro-social individuals [12, 13].
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Figure 1: A classical view on cooperation level and decision times in the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma. (Left) The decision times start from a similar initial value of ≈ 7 seconds, and then
follow two different behaviours. In the inset we illustrate the direct proportionality between
mean and standard deviations. (Right) The cooperation level also starts from a similar initial
value of ≈ 0.6 for the two experiments. In the pairwise experiment full cooperation is attained,
while in the multiplayer experiment the majority of subject opt for defection. In both panels
and in the inset blue circles, green squares, and orange diamonds represent the three phases
of the multiplayer experiment (respectively fix1, rand, fix2) while red hexagons the pairwise
experiment.
A consensus is thus far from being reached, and one possible cause for this is that all stud-
ies are limited by the use of mean response times (RT). There are a number of reasons why
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tracking just the mean RT values (as in Fig. 1 left) is not a good idea. First, the experimental
RT distributions have a number of properties which prevent it from being properly described by
only mean value and standard deviation. For example the distribution it is not Gaussian but a
skewed function whose skew actually increases with the task difficulty, while the mean value
and standard deviation are proportional to one another [14] (see also the inset in Fig. 1 left).
Second, a number of factors influence the speed of decision making, including the quality of in-
formation processing (how fast one accumulates information) or response caution (how careful
we are not to make errors). An a-priori bias, telling us what the intuitive decision is, is just one
of the factors that could make the RT short. Therefore, before we can talk about intuitive and
deliberate decisions, we need first to identify a model allowing us to disentangle the different
factors of influence.
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Figure 2: Drift Diffusion modelling for decision times and cooperation levels. (Left) An
illustration of the DDM: starting from an initial condition z · a, the agents accumulate random
evidence in favour of one of two alternative decisions. The x = a threshold is associated to
cooperation and the x = 0 threshold to defection. Once the amount of evidence reaches one of
the thresholds, the associated decision is made. The arrows indicate the presence of a negative
drift towards defection, as we observe in the multiplayer experiment. (Right) The experimental
distribution for fix1 phase, fitted with the theoretical curves for the DDM (r2 = 0.97). To dis-
tinguish, the response times of defection and cooperation we display them separately (reaction
times for defection on the negative axis and those for cooperation on the positive axis). The
total areas under the two curves is normalised to one, so that the area under each of the two
curves represents the proportion of defectors and cooperators. The logarithmic scale highlights
the short tail of the distribution.
Interestingly, in neuroscience, a number of theoretical models have emerged that can be
used to explain the decision making processes. The most prominent one among these is the
Drift Diffusion Model (DDM) [15], which assumes a one-dimensional random walk behav-
ior representing the accumulation in our brain of noisy evidence in favour of two alternative
options [16].
More in detail, in the DDM at each moment subjects randomly collect evidence in favour of
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one of two alternative choices, which are in our case cooperation and defection. The continuous
integration of evidence in time is described by the evolution of an one-dimensional brownian
motion (see Methods), whose stochastic character is a consequence of the noisy nature of the
evidence [17, 18]. The process is starting from a possibly biased initial condition, and the two
options are associated to two absorbing barriers (see Fig. 2 left). The distribution of first pas-
sage times at those thresholds has been successfully used to model decision time in a wide
range of contexts [14]. The most typical context is visual decision making [19] where a sub-
ject (human or monkey) needs to determine as quickly as possible the direction of a cloud of
dots [20]. Comparing empirical RTs with the model allows us to evaluate its free parameters: i)
the threshold a, is the quantity that quantifies response caution; ii) the drift rate v is a measure of
subjects’ ability to gather evidence, also dependent on task difficulty; iii) the bias z represents
the a-priori inclination for one of the alternatives. We also introduce a fourth parameter, the
non-decision time t0, that accounts here for the perceptual and motor processes associated with
the task, processes which play a very minor role here given the longer characteristic timescale
of the RTs in our experiments.
The application of DDM to more deliberate economic decision making has been uncertain
until recently [14], and the model is still largely unknown in the experimental game theory
community. In the last year, some experiments have showed that DDM can be applied to eco-
nomic experiments, however only in situations when the player has the full information. For
example when the outcome does not depend on the action of the opponents such as in the Dic-
tators Game [21, 22], or when the action of the opponent is already known, such as on the
receivers side of the Ultimatum Game [21]. The decision making in the aforementioned works
is value-based, but not strategic. The players know exactly how much will be their payoff for
each decision, and this payoff does not depend at all on the actions of other players.
Here we extend the use of the DDM to outline the cognitive basis of cooperative decision
making and characterise the evolution of a subject’s behavior when facing strategic choices
in game theory experiments, where the decision is dependent on the unknown action of the
opponent. The application of DDM to Prisoner’s Dilemma games is not obvious given the
current state of the art, since in the deliberation process includes forming an opinion on what the
other player would do. For example, the model proposed in [22] takes into account how much
the players care about themselves and about other players. A similar approach to decisions in
complex strategy games would require the development of a non-trivial addition to the model
trying to predict the decision of the other player, but there is no obvious way to include this in
the model.
In particular, we examine the results of two different weak Prisoner’s dilemma experiments
iterated over a large number of rounds [23, 24, 25]: i) a pairwise game with 16 players associated
in fixed couples, iterated 100 times; ii) a multiplayer game on 13x13 lattice with 8 neighbours,
where in every round each player makes a single action (cooperate or defect) which applies to
a game against each neighbour. All participants of the multiplayer experiment played a total of
165 rounds in 3 separate phases: fix1, rand, fix2 (in that order). In the phases fix1 and fix2 the
network is fixed and all players play with the same neighbours. In the rand phase the network is
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randomly shuffled after every round, so the players always play with different neighbours. (For
more details see the Methods or the original papers [23, 24, 25]).
In both experiments, the cooperation level starts from a value close to 60%. In the multi-
player game this then converges to low cooperation (≈ 20%), while in the pairwise game an
almost full cooperation is attained after about 70 rounds (see Fig. 1 right). Thus, these two
experiments allow us to observe two different scenarios: one where the cooperation is not es-
tablished, and one where it is. Thanks to this broad variability in subjects’ behavior, we can
also control if the strength of preference is influencing or not our conclusions [10].
In Figures 2 right and S3 we show that DDM successfully fit the empirical RTs of the differ-
ent phases of our experiment. In the following, we show what one can observe by tracking the
evolution of the DDM parameters in our experiments. This allows us in general to describe the
learning process of the subjects of game theory experiments from a novel perspective aiming at
distinguishing between rational deliberation (described by the drift v,) and intuition (associated
to the a-priori bias z). The fits have been performed using the HDDM python tool [26], which
fits simultaneously the distribution of decision times for cooperative choices, defections, and
the fraction of cooperation using Hierarchical Bayesian Estimation. (In Fig. S4 we provide the
R2 values of all the fits proposed in this paper.)
Results
Threshold. In both experiments, the threshold starts from the same value of a ≈ 5 sec 12 , in the
first round where no information on the others’ behavior is available (see Fig. 3 (a)) Then, the
threshold parameter drops for the pairwise experiment. While it initially grows for the more
complex multiplayer experiment, a drop can be then observed starting from round 5.
The value of a is the main factor determining the average decision time. In figure 4 (a) we
show how our experimental results align along the theoretical relationship 〈t〉 = a2
4
valid in
absence of bias and drift (z = 0.5, v = 0, see Methods). The value of the average decision
time in our experiment is thus dominated by the caution with which the players consider their
response. The decisions become thus progressively quicker mostly because less information is
demanded for the final deliberation. We emphasise that the fit is done simultaneously for both
decisions, therefore the observed evolution of the threshold parameter equally influences RT for
both decisions.
Drift. In the first round of both scenarios the drift speed v is zero (Fig. 3 (b)), which is con-
sistent with the lack of information to consider for a rational deliberation. It then progressively
diverges to positive values (towards cooperation) for the pairwise interaction and to negative
values (toward defection) for the multiplayer game. These opposite trends directly reflect the
level of cooperation finally attained at the end of the two experiments: the game experience is
therefore providing evidence suggesting cooperating among cooperators and defecting among
defectors.
With the notable exception of the first round, we can note in Fig. 4 that the variability of
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Figure 3: Evolution of the DDM parameters in the two experiment. (a) In the first round,
the threshold a is ≈ 5 sec 12 in both experiments. For the pairwise experiment we then ob-
serve a decreasing trend, while for the multiplayer experiment we observe an increase in the
second round, followed by a progressive drop in the course of the experiments. (b) The ab-
solute value of the drift speed |v| also starts from a common value approximatively zero. Its
absolute value progressively increases for both experiments, showing how players process the
information faster. The sign differs between the two experiments, because for the multiplayer
case the gathered information suggests to defect while for the pairwise interaction it suggests to
cooperate. The random phase of the multiplayer experiment has higher |v|, which is consistent
with the fact that the setup of the random phase is easier. (c) Both experiment suggest an initial
bias towards cooperation z ≈ 0.55. The bias then changes progressively in the direction of
the average behavior of the other participants: positive bias for the cooperation in the pairwise
experiment, negative bias for the defection in the multiplayer experiment (in Fig. S5 we show
that this trend does not depend by the player’s actions). In the multiplayer experiment, after
each phase the bias resets to its initial value of 0.55, suggesting a resilience in the human bias
towards cooperation. (d) The non decision time t0 drops after a few rounds to a constant value
of ≈ 0.6 sec for the multiplayer experiment and ≈ 0.3 sec for the pairwise experiment. At the
first round of the second and third phases of the multiplayer experiment, we observe a clear
outlier, possibly accounting for the fact that the individuals were not ready for the next phase.
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v is here the main factor behind the evolution of the cooperation rate CR, with CR ≈ (1 +
exp (−5v))−1, as expected for no bias (z = 0.5) and with the threshold observed at the first
round (a = 5 sec
1
2 ). In our iterated game, cooperation or defection therefore emerge here
mostly as a consequence of informed deliberation.
The different scenarios explored in the multiplayer experiment allow us to also to illustrate
how the absolute value of v depends on the difficulty of the task [16]. Indeed, |v| progressively
grows between fix1 and fix2, while for the random phase the value is stable and, on average,
significantly higher than in fix1 and fix2 (see Table S1). These higher values of the drift speed |v|
are consistent with the easier design of the random phase, where the information on the previous
decisions of the neighbours is not available. At the same time, deliberations in the similarly
designed fix1 and fix2 become gradually easier, as the players become more and more proficient
in processing the information provided. In the random phase of the multiplayer experiment the
absolute value of the parameter v is higher because the neighbours are changing and therefore
they do not need to keep track of all relationships.
Bias. The initial value of the a-prori bias z is≈ 60%. This value perfectly reflects the coop-
eration rate in the first turn: we have indeed CR = z when the drift is null (v = 0), as we have
in the first turn. The bias then grows in the pairwise experiment (where players cooperate) and
drops in the multiplayer experiment (where they mostly defect). This drop is independent from
the players’ strategy (see Fig. S5). This suggests that any inclination prior to rational deliber-
ation is strongly influenced by the other players’ behavior, with the bias increased following
positive interactions as much as reduced after negative ones. The initial bias towards coopera-
tion is however resilient, as in the multiplayer experiment it resets to ≈ 60% after each pause.
This is not reflected in the cooperation rate, because the drift quickly becomes, and remains,
the dominant factor in the decision process (see ‘Rationality’ and Fig. 5). The bias parame-
ter mostly captures minor deviations of decision time and cooperation rate from the analytical
tendencies described above (Fig. 4 (c) and (d)).
Non-decision time. In Fig. 3 (d) we show that the perceptual and motor processes associated
with the task speed up with repetition, but a stable value is reached after about 5 rounds. In
the simpler pairwise experiment the non-decision time reaches the value expected for a purely
visual reaction time of t0 ≈ 0.3 seconds [27]. The initial drop in t0 partially accounts for the
decrease in RTs over time (Fig 1 (left)). Notably, the drop becomes significant after the pauses
in the multiplayer experiment. Excluding the first 5 rounds, the average non-decision time is of
0.29± 0.03 in the pairwise experiment and 0.59± 0.03 in the multilayer experiment, for which
also the first rounds of rand and fix2 has been filtered out.
Rationality. In absence of bias or drift, decisions are completely random and the coop-
eration rate is expected to be Cteo(v = 0, a, z = 0.5) = 0.5. The deviation of the experi-
mental cooperation rate C from random behavior can be decomposed into a contribution due
to v (rationality) and a contribution due to z (intuition). If only the bias is absent, one would
expect a cooperation rate Cteo(v, a, z = 0.5). Therefore, we identify as contribution of the
rational deliberation the difference ∆Crat = Cteo(v, a, z = 0.5) − 0.5, and as contribution of
the intuitive bias the difference between the empirical value and what expected without bias
7
(a)
1 2 3 4 5 6
a (sec
1
2) [barrier]
0
2
4
6
8
10
〈t〉
(s
ec
)
(b)
−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
v (sec −
1
2) [drift]
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
ac
tio
n
of
co
op
er
at
or
s
(c)
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
z [bias]
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Ti
m
e
R
es
id
ua
l(
se
c)
(d)
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
z [bias]
−0.20
−0.15
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
C
oo
pe
ra
tio
n
R
es
id
ua
l
Figure 4: How the DDM parameters are linked to average decision time and cooperation
level in game theory experiments. (a) The dominant parameter for the decision time is the
threshold a. The black solid line represents the value 〈t− t0〉 = a2/4 expected in absence drift
and bias (v = 0, z = 0.5). (b) The dominant parameter for the cooperation level is the drift
speed v. The black solid line represents the value Cteo(v, a, z = 0.5) = (1 + exp(−av))−1 ex-
pected in absence of drift (z = 0.5), where we fixed the threshold at the initial value a = 5 sec
1
2 .
(c) The drift z plays a secondary role in the decision time: its values is positively correlated with
the residual Rt = 〈t〉 − 〈t〉teoz=0.5 if v < 0 (as in the multiplayer experiment) and negatively if
v > 0 (as in the pairwise experiment). For the multiplayer experiment, where we have better
statistics, the value of the residual is an order of magnitude less than the average decision time.
(d) The drift z plays a secondary role also for the cooperation level: its values is positively
correlated with the residual RC = C − Cteo(v, a, z = 0.5). In the multiplayer experiment, the
bias alters up to the 10% of all decisions, an effect of the same order of magnitude of the finally
attained cooperation level of ≈ 20%.
∆Cint = C − Cteo(v, a, z = 0.5). In Figure 5, we represent the evolution of the ‘rationality
ratio’ R = |∆Crat|/(|∆Crat|+ |∆Cint|). In case of totally intuitive decisions one would expect
R = 0 while in case of totally rational decision R = 1. In our experiments, the numerical result
for the first rounds in both experiments suggests a compromise between rational and intuitive
behavior (R ≈ 0.5). It is however important to remark here that for both experiments the value
v = 0 lies within the margin of errors for the first rounds, and consequently our results are
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Figure 5: The players’ choices becomes progressively dominated by deliberation as the
experiments progress. In figure we represent the ‘rationality ratio’, a quantity derived by the
cooperation levels designed to be R = 0 for totally intuitive decisions and R = 1 for totally
rational decisions. Tracking the evolution of R we can see how, after a sufficient number of
repetitions, the decisions made become mostly a consequence of rational deliberation. For the
first rounds our fits suggest an almost perfect balance between intuition and deliberation (R ≈
0.5). At round 20 in the multiplayer experiment, and at round 50 in the pairwise experiment,
the ratio R settles to values higher than 0.8, indicating a stable rational behavior. Error bars
represent here the variability due to the uncertainty in our estimate of v (see Fig. 3 (b)).
not inconsistent with the hypothesis that the first round are dominated by intuition (R = 0). If
for the first rounds we have a balance between intuition and deliberation, it then appears clear
that as the players learn how to play the game, their behavior becomes ultimately rational as R
grows reaching values close to 1.
These results show how rational deliberation, based on the gathered information, quickly
becomes dominant over an initial intuitive bias towards cooperation. The role of intuition is
still decisive when any information on the expected behavior of other players is lacking, as in
the first rounds or in one-shot experiments [2, 4, 8] where the faster decision is the cooperative
one. Consistently, in interative experiments, which are averaging the first round with a relatively
large number of the later rounds [3] this trend has not been observed.
Intuition is not however strictly suggesting cooperating, as the bias can turn towards de-
fection after playing multiple rounds in an un-cooperative environment. Nevertheless, the re-
silience of the bias we observe between the phases of the multiplayer experiment confirms that
we might have a ‘natural’ intuitive optimism concerning the social behavior of the others. This
is because, although the initial attitude leans toward faster decisions associated with coopera-
tion, learning the game implies becoming a rational player. If the rational choice is to defect,
as in our multiplayer experiment, spontaneous altruism is just a transient effect possibly due to
optimistic initial expectations [28], after which it defection becomes the quicker answer.
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Discussion
Our results above are not only proof that the use of the Drift Diffusion Model can be extended
to the description of the complex strategic actions taken during game theory experiments, but
illustrate how an accurate modelling of decision times allows us to get new detailed insight
on human decision process from a neuro-economics [29] perspective. This kind of statistical
approach is possible when the datasets are large enough to make it possible to statistically test
the exact shape of the empirical decision times distribution. In our case, the multiplayer game
with 169 players allowed us to study every round separately to confirm the remarkable ability
of such a simple model to summarise very rich experimental results with up to 8000-10000 de-
cisions. Tracking the evolution of the drift speed v, the accumulation threshold a, and the initial
bias z during the experiment offers a new perspective into this learning process. This would
not be possible by only studying the average decision times and permits a new interpretation of
differences between experiments, contexts, experience, inclinations and strategies.
In particular, we show here that analyzing the empirical results using DDM is a method
surely more appropriate for the difficult task of distinguishing between deliberation (described
by the drift) and intuition (associated to the bias) than simply comparing the average response
times. We see here that it is not in general true that faster decisions are dictated by intuition, nor
that the intuition necessarily suggests cooperating. The drift in the DDM embodies the effects
of strength-of-preference [10], as it can be seen as representing how the different utility between
the chosen and unchosen options is estimated during deliberation [17]. When the context of the
game suggests the players to defect, cooperative decisions are faster only in the first round, or
equivalently in one shot games. In this case, the decision is indeed dictated by intuition, since
there is no game experience to base a rational decision on, and the cooperation level equals the
value of the bias z. But if then the decision process is repeated, rational deliberation becomes
dominant over an initial intuitive bias towards cooperation. As we learn the game, the value
of |v| grows as the process of integration of evidence becomes more efficient, allowing us to
make faster but more rational decisions. This process is coupled with a progressive drop in
the threshold a, as players also become less cautious and demand less information for the final
deliberation, and with a rapid accommodation of our perceptual and motor systems to the task
at hand embodied by the non-decision time t0. The transition between naive and informed
decisions demands only a few rounds (See Fig. 5), after which the effect of the initial bias
towards cooperation becomes marginal. At this point, the players decision are no longer naive
but mostly rational, however the underlying bias also is subject to an evolution which depends
on the context of the game. When we play a game where most of the players are defectors, the
intuitive decision progressively becomes to defect, while when we play with cooperators we
become even more biased towards cooperation. The good news is that after only a short pause,
the bias towards cooperation resets to its initial ‘natural’ value of 60%. This ‘natural’ bias is
therefore resilient to short term experiences.
More in general, the possibility of monitoring in real time the learning process by study-
ing a single and easy to measure quantity, response times, allows for the development of new
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practices to test whether the players (humans or animals) have mastered the task and to elim-
inate any initial transients by verifying if they have reached a steady state. Future studies can
take advantage of the apparent universal validity of DDM, the range of use of which spans
from memory retrieving, to perceptual, value based, and strategic decision making. Indeed,
this suggests that the neurophysiology behind all these types of decision is similar, and that a
set of decision models with a more elaborate architecture, which can be re-conducted to DDM
under some parametric choices, represent natural candidates for a more detailed description of
strategic decision making [15].
Materials and Methods
Multiplayer experiment
The game theory experiment was performed in April 2009, at the Universidad Carlos III de
Madrid in Spain. The participants were 169 students from the Engineering Campus of Leganes.
The subject’s age ranges between 18 and 26 years old. They played a Multiplayer Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game on a square lattice, simultaneously with eight neighbours (Moore’s
neighbourhood: up, down, left, right and diagonally). The lattice had periodic boundary condi-
tions as if the players were placed on a torus. They had to choose one action: Cooperate (C) or
Defect (D), which would be then applied to the game with each of their eight neighbours. For
each neighbour, they would earn the payoff which is presented in the table:
C D
C 7 0
D 10 0
If they both cooperate, they each earn a “Reward for mutual cooperation” R = 7 cents, if
they defect and the other person cooperates they earn a “Temptation to defect” T = 10 cents,
and if the other player defects they earn nothing. Therefore “Punishment for mutual defection”
and the “Suckers payoff” are both zero P = S = 0. Notice that this is a weak Prisoner’s
Dilemma. If the other player defects, the focal player earns nothing in any case and there is no
cost in switching to cooperating. The reason for choosing a weak Prisoner’s Dilemma setup is
to make the game more cooperative than a strict Prisoner’s Dilemma. For each round, the total
payoff for each player is then calculated as a sum of the outcomes from all eight games. At the
end of the experiment, the participants are rewarded proportionally to the payoff accumulated
in Euros.
All participants experience the following steps: i) login; ii) read the instructions; iii) test
if they understood the instructions; iv) the experiment itself. The experiment has three phases:
fix1 (fixed network during all the rounds), rand (network reshuffled after every round), fix2
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(fixed network, however different from the network in the fix1). In the original paper, these
phases were called exp1, control and exp2. Here, we are renaming them in order to provide
more intuitive names for this specific context. The size of network was a very important factor
for the original experiment. In particular, the objective was to have a number of players an
order of magnitude larger than any previous experiment. Because of the number of participants
needed, it was impossible to have multiple sessions. However, we believe that the system
is large enough to self-average. In any case, the lack of multiple session does not have any
influence on the particular analysis in this paper. At all stages, the information provided to them
on the screen (Figures S1 and S2) is the result of the previous round they played: the actions
and payoffs of themselves and all of their neighbours. This means that, in the rand phase, the
players have no information about their new neighbours when they need to make the decision
and they only rely on their experience and expectations. There was no practice round of the
experiment, as it was not intended for the participant to receive any experience in the game
before it started. However, we did make sure that they understood the rules by giving them a 4
different situations which could occur during the game and asking them how much money they
would earn in those situations. It should be emphasised that all students participated in all three
phases of the experiment. Therefore the different phases are not independent, since in each
phase they have the experience from the previous one. Consequently, the phase we call rand
is not a proper control of the experiment, in which the player without the previous experience
would play the game. In order to avoid having players defect in the last round, knowing that
there is no more game to play and therefore no reason to cooperate anymore, the end of the
game was decided randomly by computer and it was at round 47, 60 and 58 respectively for
fix1, rand and fix2. The data set is very large, making in total more than 27000 decisions.
The software used in the experiment was developed in PHP, javascript with python controlling
the background processes. The participants had 30 seconds to take an action afterwards the
computer would make a decision for them, but there is no countdown to the deadline shown. The
automatic decisions were excluded from the analysis. As the primary purpose of the experiment
was not a precise measurement of the decision times, they were recorded on the server, not on
the client. Therefore there was a certain delay in their measurement. We estimate these delays
by analyzing the times recorded for the automatic decisions, which are made by the client in
exactly 30 seconds. This recording goes under the same procedure as the other times. On
average the delay in the system was less than 0.03 seconds, which makes it only ≈0.5% of the
average decision time. More importantly, the standard deviation of the delays is even smaller of
around only 0.01% (4 · 10−4 seconds). Thus, their influence on the shape of the decision times
distribution is only of a negligible shift that gets included in the non-decision time t0. Three
outliers, with delays of more than 30 seconds, were excluded from the analysis.
Pairwise experiment
This experiment has been performed in 2015 at Brussels Experimental Economics Lab, at Vrije
Universiteit Brussels. The requirement site is made using ORSEE [30]. The game played
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was Weak Pairwise Prisoner’s Dilemma; each player played with one fixed partner a Prisoner’s
Dilemma with the following payoff matrix:
C D
C 3 0
D 4 0
The participants were mostly students aged between 19 and 32, with the majority being
students. There were 18 players playing in 9 independent couples for 100 rounds each. They
each had 30 seconds to take the action and they had a counter on the screen telling them how
much time they had left. However after 30 seconds were up, they could still play, but would be
given a warning to take action immediately. In most rounds all the players took their actions
in a much shorter time than the given 30 seconds limit. The experiment lasted less than 45
minutes from the moment participants entered the room until the moment they left. We adapted
the software from the previous experiment to be used for this one.
Drift Diffusion Model
For the description of the response times distributions for binary decisions, we use a statistical
decision model, the Drift Diffusion Model (DDM), which has the advantage of being defined
by a simple linear, first-order, stochastic differential equation. In the DDM, at each moment
subjects randomly collect evidence in favour of one of two alternative hypotheses. The contin-
uous integration of evidence in time is described by the evolution of x(t) as a one-dimensional
brownian motion with diffusion coefficient
√
D and a drift v:
dx = vdt+
√
Dξ(t) (1)
For each dt the quantity x(t) is increased by vdt (drift term) plus a noise
√
Dξ(t) (diffusive
term), where v and
√
D > 0 are constant and ξ(t) is a white noise. In absence of boundary
effects, the probability density P (x, t) of the solutions of Eq. (1) is normally distributed with
mean µ = x(0) + vt and variance σ2 = Dt.
Given two barriers at x = 0 and x = a and an initial condition x(0) = z · a with z ∈ (0, 1),
it is well defined the commonly called “gambler’s ruin problem” [31], where x(0) represents
the initial bankroll of the gambler, the absorption at x = a represents the gambler leaving
a possibly unfair game (if v 6= 0) after collecting her target winnings a, and the absorption
at x = 0 represents the gambler’s ruin. The probability distribution of the times at which the
process reaches the origin x = 0 before reaching the exit value x = a is known as Fu¨rth formula
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for first passages
P (t; v, a, z,D) =
pi
√
D
a2
exp
(
− vza√
D
− v
2t
2
√
D
)
×
∞∑
k=1
k exp
(
−k
2pi2
√
Dt
2a2
)
sin (kpiz) ,
which represents the probability distribution that a gambler will be ruined at time t and is
characterised by an exponential tail.
The parameters v,D and z being interdependent, it is common practice to setD = 1 and use
only the other three parameters to fit to the data with the curve P (t; v, a, z) = P (t; v, a, z,D =
1). This simplification is equivalent to re-defining the process in Eq.(1) as dx′ = v√
D
dt + ξ(t),
for a rescaled quantity x′ = x/
√
D, which starts at x′(0) = x0/
√
D and is interrupted when
x′ = a/
√
D or x′ = 0. By imposing D = 1 we have, for dimensional reasons, [a] = [t
1
2 ] and
[v] = [t−
1
2 ], which is consistent with the dimensions of the rescaled constants v′ and a′ (note
that the dimension of D is sec−1).
For describing decisions in a Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment, we associate here the barrier
at x = 0 to defection and the barrier x = z to cooperation. When v is positive, the gathered in-
formation for the deliberation is tendentially in favour of cooperation, while when it is negative
the evidence gathered is mostly supporting defection. The module of the drift speed |v| [sec−1]
is the signal-to-noise ratio of the drift representing the unbalance in the amount of evidence sup-
porting the two alternative options. |v| depends upon the difficulty of the decision. The lower |v|
the more difficult the task [19, 16, 32]. The initial condition x(0) here describes the biases prior
to deliberation. An unbiased initial condition would be z = 0.5. For values above 0.5 the deci-
sion maker has a bias toward cooperation and below 0.5 the initial bias is toward defection. The
probability distribution P (t; v, a, z) thus describes the decision times of rounds where the ulti-
mate decision is defection. Conversely, the probability distribution to associate with cooperative
rounds is P (t,−v, a, 1− z). The area under the curve CteoR (v, a, z) =
∫∞
0
P (t;−v, a, 1− z)dt
corresponds to the fraction of cooperation expected. The curve fit algorithm we used [26] fits
at the same time the non-normalised distributions P (t, v, a, z) and P (t,−v, a, 1− z), thus eval-
uating at the same time the decision times for cooperation and defection, and the fraction of
cooperation.
In the modelling of decision times, the quantity x(t) is associated to the difference in the
amount of evidence supporting the two alternatives. To better illustrate this point of view, it is
convenient to shift the process so that an unbiased initial condition, which lies exactly between
the two barriers x(0) = a/2 (z=0.5), is mapped to x = 0 and the barriers become symmetrical
x = ±a/2 [15]. The new quantity x′ = x − a/2 can then be associated to i) the difference in
activity (firing rate) in two neuronal populations, each associated to one of the two alternative
options (neuroscience perspective [16]); ii) the difference between the utility expected for the
two options (economic perspective [17]). In both cases, |x′| represents the expected benefit
obtained from taking the decision which is better supported by the evidence. Again from the
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neuroscience perspective, the final decision is then made by a second brain circuit that acts
downstream detecting the event of the threshold crossing [33].
The distance between the barriers a is the threshold parameter of the DDM, representing the
amount of information needed for the final decision. Its value can be naturally associated to the
average first passage time of the diffusion process without drift (v = 0) in the unbiased case
(z = 0.5).
Indeed, the average value of the decision times 〈t〉 for this unbiased case has the form [15]
〈t〉teoz=0.5 =
a
2v
tanh
(av
2
)
. (2)
In the limit for v → 0, we have a pure diffusion process and Eq.(2) leads to the identity 〈t〉 =
a2/4 (see Fig. 4a). Therefore, we can identify a2/4 as the average first passage time for a similar
diffusion process without drift.
Again for the unbiased case, it is possible to compute the fraction of cooperation expected
given v and a [15] (see Fig. 4b):
CteoR (v, a, z = 0.5) =
1
1 + exp (−av) . (3)
Higher values of v yield faster and more precise decisions, whereas higher values of a
permit averaging out uncorrelated noise more consistently, producing slower but more accurate
responses. As a consequence, the model is able to describe consistently the speed/accuracy
trade-off observed for decisions made under pressure [34].
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Figure S1: The interface of the multiplayer experiment. On the left: the screen in the first
round of each phase. On the right: the screen in the following rounds.
Figure S2: The interface of the pairwise experiment. On the left: the screen in the first round
of each phase. On the right: the screen in the following rounds.
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Figure S3: Experimental distribution fitted with the theoretical curves for the DDM. (a)
Multiplayer experiment, random phase (r2 = 0.94). (b) Multiplayer experiment, fix 2 phase
(r2 = 0.95). (c) Pairwise experiment (r2 = 0.99).
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Figure S4: r2 value of the fits described in Figs. 3-5.
20
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
z
MCC
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
PD
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
PC
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
PD to MCC
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
MCC to PD
Figure S5: The drop in the value of the bias z is independent by the players’ strategy.
In the multiplayer experiment we can separate players into three types: Moody conditional
cooperators (MCC), pure defectors (PD), and pure cooperators (PC) [23]. PD and PC are the
players who always defect or cooperate and MCC change their action depending on what their
neighbours did in the previous round and what they themselves did in the previous round. Here
we separate players by the strategy they picked in fix1 and fix2: in the first three panels we show
the results for users who kept the same strategy in both phases, while in the latter two users who
switched between two different strategies. In all the cases we observe a similar average drop in
the value of the bias z. The progressive emergence of a bias towards defection is therefore not
related to the users actions or strategy. Consequently, we argue that it necessarily depends on
the experience of playing against a majority of defectors.
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multiplayer fix1 multiplayer rand multiplayer fix2 pairwise
Rounds 47 60 58 100
〈t〉 (sec) 6.73 5.02 4.98 1.59
STD(t) (sec) 4.56 3.55 3.57 2.06
SEM(t) (sec) 0.67 0.46 0.47 0.21
CR 28.7% 18.5% 22.9% 88.8%
a (sec
1
2 ) 5.32± 0.03 4.86± 0.02 4.73± 0.02 3.01± 0.04
v (sec−
1
2 ) −0.203± 0.005 −0.357± 0.006 −0.284± 0.006 0.35± 0.02
z 0.529± 0.004 0.529± 0.004 0.509± 0.004 0.731± 0.006
t0 (sec) 0.38± 0.01 0.340± 0.007 0.315± 0.005 0.236± 0.003
r2 0.97 0.94 0.95 0.99
Table S1: Average and fit values for the whole phases of the multiplayer experiment and
for the pairwise experiment These values describe the distribution and fits in Figure 2 and
Figure S3. We remark that between the phases fix2 and rand one would not see any significative
differences if the study were considering only the moments of the decision times distribution.
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